Link to Case
Keywords: 4th Amendment, Automobile Exception, Trailer
Panel: Laval, Wesley, and Gleeson (USDJ, EDNY)
Opinion by: Wesley
Appeal from: SDNY (Pauley, USDJ)
Result below: Denied motion to suppress
Result: Reversed
Automobile Exception and Trailers
A bad decision from a good panel.
The Court holds that a trailer (which contained drugs), unhitched from its cab and parked in a warehouse with its legs dropped, is subject to search under the “automobile exception” first established in the prohibition-era case Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Carroll upheld a car search based on the automobiles ability to be moved quickly and “put out of reach of a search warrant.” Here, the district court held that the exception did not apply because “a stationery trailer, detached from a tractor cab with its legs dropped, and stored in side a warehouse, is not a vehicle that is readily mobile or in use for transportation.” In reversing the district court, the panel rejected the district court’s suggestion that the agents “were required to halt an ongoing investigation to wait at the scene and ensure that the trailer remained secure while a search warrant was obtained,” holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not necessitate such a course of action.” Slip Op. at 20. Actually, it does, and it did, until this mistaken decision expanded the automobile exception beyond its reasonable bounds.
A quick computer search indicates that there are cases going both ways on this issue (although surprisingly few on point), with state courts being generally more protective than federal. Compare United States v. Smith, 623 F.Supp.2d 693 (WD Va 2009) (unhitched trailer in open field subject to search under automobile exception even though no tractor found nearby); State v. Kypreos, 115 Wash. App. 207 (2002) (search of unhitched “fifth wheel trailer” not justified under automobile exception because the unhitched trailer is not “readily mobile”), review denied, 149 Wash.2d 1029 (2003); State v. Durbin, 170 Wis. 2d 475 (1992) (search of parked camper trailer not justified under automobile exception because an unhitched trailer is “not inherently mobile or even readily mobile”); United States v. Ervin, 907 F.2d 1534 (5th Cir. 1990) (camper trailer subject to automobile exception because it was attached to a car). If the primary rationale for the automobile exception is mobility — and the Supreme Court has made clear that it is — then it is illogical to justify search of an unhitched, immobilized trailer in a seized warehouse under the exception.
There are other factors in the case which make reasonable the desire to uphold the search, even if the ultimate rationale is an unjustified and unwise weakening of the Fourth Amendment. First, of course, the officers had probable cause to believe that the trailer contained drugs. The search would not be justified under the automobile exception without probable cause. But in the absence of exigent circumstances, police should be encouraged to obtain warrants. Second, one of the conspirators consented to a search of the warehouse containing the cab “and anything that was in there.” It is unclear why that consent did not or could not extend to the cab itself. Third, it is true, as the panel notes, that the trailer is mobile. But it is not mobile without a cab, and the police were firmly in control of the trailer and could easily have obtained a warrant to search the trailer with a minimal amount of fuss. Finally, it is also true that interstate commercial trucking is pervasively regulated and that there is a diminished expectation of privacy in the contents of tractor trailers, such as to justify a warrantless administrative search. But as the court impliedly concedes, there is no basis for upholding the search of the trailer as a valid administrative search.
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Here’s the district court’s analysis:
Under the automobile exception, police may conduct a warrantless search of a readily mobile motor vehicle if probable cause exists to believe the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime.” United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 492 (2d Cir.2007). “The reasons for the vehicle exception are twofold. Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, “[w]hen a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes-temporary or otherwise-the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 392, 105 S.Ct. 2066. However, “[w]hether a vehicle is ‘readily mobile’ within the meaning of the automobile exception has more to do with the inherent mobility of the vehicle than with the potential for the vehicle to be moved from the jurisdiction, thereby precluding a search.” Howard, 489 F.3d at 493 (emphasis added). “Even when there is little practical likelihood that the vehicle will be driven away, the exception applies at least when that possibility exists.” Howard, 489 F.3d at 493 (emphasis added).
No case law addresses the situation presented here-a trailer unhooked from a tractor cab and stored in a warehouse. However, the automobile exception generally relates to some type of vehicle that is capable of moving on its own. The vehicle exception does not turn “on the other uses to which a vehicle might be put … [but rather] on the ready mobility of the vehicle, and on the presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation.”Carney, 471 U.S. at 394, 105 S.Ct. 2066. A stationary trailer, detached from a tractor cab with its legs dropped, and stored inside a warehouse, is not a vehicle that is readily mobile or in use for transportation.
The relevant issue is whether there is a possibility that the vehicle could be driven away. Howard, 489 F.3d at 493-94(possibility existed where drivers were detained, but “confederates in another car, of whom the police were unaware, might have observed the police intervention and might drive the car away”). Here, Defendants were under arrest, and more than a dozen government agents surrounded the warehouse. It is hard to imagine a scenario where the tractor-trailer could have been hooked up to a cab and driven away.
Even where a vehicle is not readily mobile “a warrantless search … would be justified based on the diminished expectation of privacy enjoyed by the drivers and passengers ….” Howard, 489 F.3d at 494. However, under the circumstances described at the hearing in this case, the unhitched trailer in the warehouse does not constitute a vehicle in use for transportation. Accordingly, the Government cannot rely on the automobile exception to introduce the 230 kilograms of cocaine that it seized after drilling through the roof of the trailer.
U.S. v. Navas, 640 F.Supp.2d 256, 267 -268 (SDNY. 2009), reversed –F.3d–, 2010 WL 760131 (2d Cir. March 8, 2010).
